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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
"The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many
second and third generation Japanese born on United States
soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become
'Americanized', the racial strains are undiluted."l With
these words Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, Commanding
General of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,
presented the military's justification for evacuating
Japanese Americans along with Japanese, German, and Italian
aliens from the West Coast during World War II. Prior to
the middle of January 1942, government officials had
contemplated relocating and interning only "alien enemies,"
yet by the time President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued
Executive Order Number 9066 on February 19, 1942, the War
Department intended to relocate Americans of Japanese
ancestry as well as all Axis aliens.
The decision to evacuate Japanese Americans from the
West Coast during World War II is a topic which continues to
fascinate historians. The problem with focusing on the
1 Memorandum from Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt to
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, 13 February 1942, in American
Concentration Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and
Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942-1945, ed. Roger
Daniels, vol. 2 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989}i no page
numbers.
1
actual decision to remove Japanese Americans is complex and
simple at the same time. One must keep in mind that
although they may not have consciously realized it at the
time, government officials somehow knew that the federal
government would eventually evacuate Japanese Americans
along with enemy aliens, but they simply did not know how
they would justify and execute that removal. Between
December 7, 1941 and February 19, 1942, the government
developed a plan that would allow for the removal of all
Axis aliens as well as Americans of Japanese descent from
restricted areas on the West Coast, citing ~military
necessityU as the basis for the evacuation. By asserting
that the military had the right to exclude any and all
persons from certain military reservations in order to
protect strategic defense areas, the government could
justify infringing on the rights of American ci zens.
Major Karl R. Bendetsen, later promoted to lieutenant
colonel, developed and convinced General DeWitt to support
the plan which allowed the Army to remove Japanese Americans
from these restricted areas on the West Coast.
Historians have examined almost every aspect of the
evacuation and internment decision and the process of
relocation, yet the decision-making process continues to
fascinate some scholars. Varied interpretations of the
2
causes of the evacuation decision exist, as one would
expect. Many scholars assert that General DeWitt was racist
and allowed his personal beliefs to influence his decision
to evacuate the Japanese from the coast. 2 Racism alone,
however, cannot account for the reasoning behind the
general's decision. Allan R. Bosworth states in America's
Concentration Camps that ultimately, DeWitt was the Western
Defense Commander and as the "man with the stars on his
shoulders [he] also carries the full weight of
responsibility.,,3 Indeed, without DeWitt's recommendation,
one can question whether or not the evacuation would have
occurred at all.
Other scholars blame the War Department and its many
officials for formulating and implementing the exclusion
plan. Noted ethnic and internment his orian Roger Daniels
asserts that DeWitt was indeed racist but was also "merely
an instrument" in other officials' plan to remove the
Japanese from the coast. 4 In Concentration Camps U.S.A.:
2 Allan R. Bosworth, America's Concentration Camps (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967), 63; Roger Daniels, The
Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans, ed. Harold M. Hyman
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975), 14 (hereafter
cited Decision), 14; Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and
Floyd Matson, Prejudice, War and the Constitution: Japanese
American Evacuation and Resettlement (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1954).
3 Bosworth, America's Concentration Camps, 247.
4 Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps U.S.A.: Japanese
Americans and World War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1971), 17.
3
Japanese Americans and World War II, Daniels argues that
Major Bendetsen and General Allen W. Gullion of the Provost
Marshal General's Office were the two military officials
ultimately responsible for the president issuing Executive
Order No. 9066. Bendetsen urged DeWitt to attempt to gain
more authority, and Gullion and Bendetsen were upset when
the Western Defense Commander appeared to oppose or back
away from endorsing Japanese evacuation. Further, Bendetsen
and Gullion convinced Assistant Secretary of War John J.
McCloy of the necessity of removing the Japanese to prevent
sabotage. s
In United States Army in World War II: The Western
Hemisphere: Guarding the United States and Its Outposts,
Army historian Stetson Conn presents a detailed chronology
of the actual War Department decision to remove the J panese
from the West Coast. Conn asserts that Major Bendetsen
urged DeWitt to press the Department of Justice for broader
alien control efforts and, apparently under the direction of
McCloy, eventually influenced the lieutenant general's
decision to support evacuation. 6 In assigning
5 Ibid., 45, 53, 59, 64.
6 Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engleman, and Byron Fairchild,
United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere:
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 118, 129. Most of the
material found in Guarding the United States and Its Outposts was
printed as an essay in Stetson Conn, "The Decision to Evacuate
the Japanese from the Pacific Coast (1942)," Command Decisions,
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responsibility to one person for the mass evacuation, Conn
states that because the War Department's directives for the
removal differed from General DeWitt's original
recommendations, "the only responsible commander who backed
the War Department's plan as a measure required by military
necessity was the President himself, as Commander in
Chief."7
Other authors have placed the blame for the relocation
decision on one member of the War Department. In The Great
Betrayal: The Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans During
World War II, Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis assert that
Gullion swayed DeWitt to support the removal of Japanese
citizens. s Ellen Levine argues that Secretary of War Henry
L. Stimson simply appointed DeWitt to execute the exclusion
plan which Bendetsen designed. 9
Still other scholars attribute non-governmental factors
in the decision leading to the removal of the Japanese. In
his quantitative analysis of the evacuation, Americans
Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation, Morton
Grodzins states that the "latent regional hostility [toward
by the U.S. Department of the Army (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1952).
7 Conn, "The Decision to Evacuate the Japanese from the
Pacific Coast (1942)," 109.
E Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis, The Great Betrayal: The
Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans During World War II (London:
Macmillan Company, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1969), 30.
9 Ellen Levine, A Fence Away From Freedom: Japanese
Americans and World War II (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995).
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the Japanese] was released by the war with Japan and
especially by the nature of that war during its first
months," resulting in business and agricultural, nativist,
and patriotic pressure groups as well as West Coast
politicians demanding the removal of the Japanese from the
coast. IO This pressure influenced the military and War
Department's decision to endorse evacuation. "Military
officers at first denied any necessity for evacuating
Japanese from interior areas of California, then insisted
upon that action in response to the renewed regional
pressure. ,,11
Ronald Takaki essentially agrees with Grodzins's
analysis of the factors which led to the evacuation of the
Japanese from the West Coast. In Strangers From A Different
Shore: A History of Asian Americans, he also asserts,
though, that General DeWitt's lack of judgment as a military
leader compounded his distrust of the Japanese. The press,
patriotic organizations, and California politicians all
called for Japanese removal, and the general made the
evacuation decision in this heated climate. Takaki points
out, however, that five years prior to the attack on Pearl
10 Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed: Politics and the
Japanese Evacuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949),
16. Americans Betrayed contains the most thorough explanation of
the pressure groups which impelled the government to exclude the
Japanese from the West Coast.
11 Ibid., 362.
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Harbor, President Roosevelt formulated plans to detain
Japanese citizens and aliens in a "'concentration camp in
the event of trouble,'" implying that the president was
predisposed to accept and condone a plan to remove the
Japanese from the coast. 12
In Prejudice, War and the Constitution: Japanese
American Evacuation and Relocation, Jacobus tenBroek, Edward
Barnhart, and Floyd Matson assert that the relocation
decision was partially the result of anti-Asian,
particularly anti-Japanese, sentiment that had existed in
California for decades. They argue that Grodzins's
"pressure group" and "politician" theories of responsibility
are inaccurate. Politicians did not cause the evacuation
because the decision was a military decision made by Army
officials. In addition, the pressure groups' ac ivities did
not correspond with the actual decision-making process. The
argument that these pressure groups or politicians could
have affected DeWitt's decision appears invalid to tenBroek,
Barnhart, and Matson because DeWitt was a career military
officer without political aspirations so he would have had
no reason to cater to the demands of California civilians.
Furthermore, DeWitt's duty was to protect the West Coast,
and he based his decision upon "military necessity." The
12 Ronald Takaki, Strangers From A Different Shore: A
History of Asian Americans (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 390.
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general was a racist, so he did not need pressure groups or
politicians to convince him of the Japanese "threat."l3
These authors conclude that many people were responsible for
the evacuation. Ultimately, the anti-Asian heritage of the
West Coast and the war itself led citizens to call for and
support evacuation. The authors also place a great deal of
the blame on General DeWitt because he proposed that the
government remove the Japanese and also requested the
authority to execute that plan; on President Franklin
Roosevelt because he was the president and responsible for
his subordinates' activities; and on the Supreme Court for
not protecting citizens' rights. l4
Like tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson, the U.S.
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
holds a variety of individuals responsible for the
relocation of Japanese Americans. The Commission places
most of the blame on General DeWitt for the decision because
he believed race determined loyalty, ignored Navy and FBI
intelligence, relied on civilian politicians to assist him
in making a military decision, and exaggerated what the
military had to do to ensure the safety of the West Coast
and its residents. President Roosevelt was also responsible
for the decision because he did not do anything to calm the
13 tenBroek, et. al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution,
187, 206-208.
14 Ibid., 330-332.
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public or disprove rumors and did not thoroughly review the
evacuation decision. Attorney General Francis Biddle and
others assigned to protect the civil liberties of citizens
also failed to do their jobs. McCloy and Stimson, too, were
at fault because they "failed to insist on clear military
justifications for the measures General DeWitt wished to
undertake. ,,15
The trouble with determining what actually affected and
who initially implemented the decision-making process is
that so many factors worked upon each other to bring about a
sense of paranoia, distrust, and urgency in the two months
following Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, these factors also
obscure the actual thought processes and ideas of the
individuals involved in the decision. Historians wade
through the conflicting ideas, vacillating opinions, an
racist assumptions to endeavor to determine who actually was
responsible for the evacuation of Japanese Americans in
early 1942.
Despite the many authors who attempt to focus on one
specific individual and his role in the evacuation decision,
placing the blame on one figure is a very simplistic and
inaccurate way of examining the events of late 1941 and
IS U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians, Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 8-9.
9
early 1942. Blaming one person for the eventual forcible
removal and relocation of Japanese Americans is as
inaccurate as believing that all members of the Japanese
race were indeed saboteurs during the war. Members of the
Justice Department and War Department, along with local
government officials and ordinary citizens, exerted
influence on the group of civilian and military leaders who
formulated the decision together.
While many people actively participated in the decision
to remove the Japanese from the West Coast, General John L.
DeWitt and Major Karl R. Bendetsen were the two key figures
involved in the initial decision-making process. Other
historians have acknowledged this fact, and some have even
discussed the importance of Bendetsen's influence on DeWitt.
What other scholars appear to have overlooked or failed to
explain is exactly how crucial the major's role was in
affecting and specifically how he affected the general's
opinion and decision regarding a mass evacuation of Japanese
from the West Coast.
The government needed General DeWitt's recommendation
for removal before it could justify and proceed with any
interference with the American Japanese. In order to
provide an acceptable justification for violating the rights
of American citizens, the government needed a legal basis
10
for the removal. Major Bendetsen adopted the idea of
military necessity as the legal foundation for forcibly
evacuating Japanese Americans from their homes, thus
providing General DeWitt with an apparently reasonable and
legal basis for supporting the evacuation of Japanese
Americans from the West Coast.
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CHAPTER TWO
PEARL HARBOR AND PARANOIA
The history of the decision to forcibly relocate
American citizens of Japanese ancestry consists of complex
issues, varied opinions, and changing attitudes.
Immediately after Pearl Harbor, the federal government did
not intend to round up and incarcerate United States
citizens. The decision to embark on such a task resulted
from legal and military opinions, cultural and wartime
paranoia, and the adaptation of various enemy alien control
programs.
Prior to World War II, the Japanese in the United
States had been victims of racial prejudice and hostility.
Anti-Japanese agitation began almost as soon as Japanese
arrived in the United States. In the late nineteenth
century, white Californians extended the anti-Asian
sentiment originally directed toward the Chinese to include
the Japanese as well. 1 Just as white laborers protested
1 Fred H. Matthews, "White Community and 'Yellow Peril,'"
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 50 (March 1964), 612; S.
Frank Miyamoto, "The Forced Evacuation of the Japanese Minority
during World War II," Journal of Social Issues 29 (1973): 18i
James A. Mackey and William E. Huntzicker, "Racism and
Relocation: Telling the Japanese-American Experience," Social
Education 55 (November/December 1991): 415. See also Thomas
Sowell, Ethnic America: A History (n.p.: Basic Books, 1981), 155.
For a discussion regarding racism as a factor leading to the
Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), see Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate:
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Chinese workers' presence in the United States, so too did
whites complain about Japanese labor and economic
competition. 2 The hostility directed toward Asians provided
the foundation for future anti-Japanese sentiment and action
in California.
The anti-Japanese campaign led to several attempts to
stop Japanese immigration, the 1913 California Alien Land
Law, and the Immigration Act of 1924. In 1909 legislators
introduced seventeen anti-Japanese bills to the California
legislature, but President Theodore Roosevelt interceded so
those bills did not become 1aw. 3 Nativist agitators
succeeded in limiting the freedom Japanese had in California
in 1913 with the Alien Land Law. This act denied "to aliens
ineligible for citizenship the right to own, lease, or
otherwise enjoy land, except to the extent provided by
treaty.u4 In many cases, Issei, or first-gener tion
Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
2 Patty Iiyama, ~American Concentration Camps: Racism and
Japanese Americans During World War II," International Socialist
Review 34 (April 1973): 25; Daniel Stephan Bozik, ~Rhetorical
Decision-Making: The Japanese-American Relocation Decision, 1941-
1945," (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University), 36-37.
3 Bozik, ~Rhetorical Decision-Making," 45; Edwin E.
Ferguson, ~The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth
Amendment," California Law Review 35 (1947): 65. See also "1913
(California) Alien Land Law," in Japanese American History: An A-
to-Z Reference from 1868 to the Present, ed. Brian Niiya (New
York: Facts on File, 1993), 257; John Higham, Strangers in the
Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 129.
4 Ferguson, ~The California Alien Land Law," 68. See also
"1913 (California) Alien Land Law," 35; Yuji Ichioka, "The Early
Japanese Immigrant Quest for Citizenship: The Background of the
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Japanese, those persons born in Japan who migrated to the
United States, circumvented the land law by purchasing land
in the names of their children, the Nisei. s The Nisei,
second-generation Japanese, were born in the United States
and therefore American citizens. Thus they could own land. 6
After a period of relative calm of anti-Japanese activity
which lasted until about the end of World War I, anti-
Japanese groups renewed their efforts against Japanese
immigration.? After 1919, dissatisfied that the 1908
Gentlemen's Agreement and the 1913 California land law had
not ended Japanese immigration, anti-immigration activists
renewed their efforts to restrict immigration. s The 1920
Alien Land Law tightened the loopholes in the 1913 law by
denying aliens ineligible for citizenship the ability to
lease or purchase land or purchase land in the names of
their children, thereby eliminating any incentive for
1922 Ozawa Case," Amerasia 4 (1977): 5-6. For more information
on the anti-Asian sentiment expressed during the 1913 California
legislative session, see Spencer C. Olin, Jr., "European
Immigrant and Oriental Alien: Acceptance and Rejection by the
California Legislature of 1913," Pacific Historical Review 35
(1966): 303-315.
5 The Alien Land Act affected Chinese, Filipinos, native
Hawaiians, and Hindus as well as Japanese. Carey McWilliams,
Prejudice: Japanese Americans, Symbol of Racial Intolerance
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1944), 49.
C Ronald Takaki, Issei and Nisei: The Settling of Japanese
America (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 1994), 80-81i
Joseph S. Roucek, "American Japanese, Pearl Harbor and World War
II," Journal of Negro Education 12 (Autumn 1943): 634.
I Iiyama, "American Concentration Camps," 26; Bozik,
"Rhetorical Decision-Making," 48.
B Bozik, "Rhetorical Decision-Making," 60; "1920
(California) Alien Land Law," in Japanese American History, 258.
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Japanese to move to the United States or remain in the
country.9 Exclusion proponents also succeeded in having
Congress pass the Immigration Act of 1924. This act banned
aliens ineligible for citizenship from entering the United
States and ended all immigration from Asia. 1o
Most Americans did not understand the historical or
cultural factors which determined how the Japanese lived in
the United States, and therefore did not understand the
Japanese as a whole. To most of these white, native-born
Americans, the Japanese were nothing more than labor or
agricultural competition, or simply unwanted immigrants.
Because they were unwanted, most Japanese resided in
isolated communities. Whites' unfamiliarity with their
Japanese neighbors and Japanese insularity, combined with a
general sense of insecurity from the war, eventually
produced an atmosphere of increased anti-Japanese sentiment
on the West Coast.
It was in this extremely charged atmosphere that the
Western Defense Commander attempted to secure the safety of
the West Coast. Lieutenant General John Lesesne DeWitt
(1880-1962), made the military his career. In 1898 he left
9 "1920 (California) Alien Land Law," 258; Roucek,
"American Japanese, Pearl Harbor and World War II," 635.
10 Iiyama, "American Concentration Camps," 26; Takaki, Issei
and Nisei, 86, 88; Miyamoto, "The Forced Evacuation of the
Japanese Minority during World War II," 17. See also
"Immigration Act of 1924," in Japanese American History, 171.
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Princeton University to fight in the Spanish-American War,
his only combat experience. II Throughout his career DeWitt
held many leadership positions, but a majority of those were
as a supply officer, specifically quartermaster. 12 He
became a lieutenant general in 1939, as well as commander of
the Fourth Army, a position he held concurrently when he
became commander of the Western Defense Command in March
1941. 13
In the months following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor,
General DeWitt attempted to ensure the safety of his
command. He rejected the idea of evacuating Japanese
citizens advocated by some nativists not long after December
7. In a December 26, 1941 conversation with Army Provost
Marshal General Allen W. Gullion, who informed him of a Los
Angeles Chamber of Commerce recommendation to arrest all the
Japanese in the city, DeWitt told Gullion that in ernin
one-hundred seventeen thousand Japanese would be "'an awful
job'" for the army and the act would likely alienate loyal
Japanese. 14 Regarding internment, the commander further
11 Glen Kitayama, "DeWitt, John Lesesne (1880-1962)," in
Japanese American History, 128.
12 "De Witt, John L(esesne)," Current Biography: Who's News
and Why, 1942, ed. Maxine Block (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1942),
197.
13 R. Manning Ancell with Christine M. Miller, The
Biographical Dictionary of World War II Generals and~ag
Officers: The U.S. Armed Forces (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1996),84.
14 Conn, "The Decision to Evacuate the Japanese from the
Pacific Coast (1942)," 90.
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stated, "'1 don't think it's a sensible thing to do... An
American citizen, after all, is an American citizen. And
while they may not be loyal, I think we can weed the
disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary.,u1S
In January 1942 the commander of the Western Defense Command
stated that the idea of a mass evacuation was "'damned
nonsense. ' ,,16
Following Japan's bombing of Pearl Harbor, few assaults
on resident Japanese population occurred. 1? Government
officials urged people not to randomly attack the Japanese
in the United States because of their race. 1S California
Governor Culbert Olson and other state officeholders
implored California citizens to be tolerant. 19 United
States Attorney General Biddle stated that he did not want
the nation's Japanese "to become scapegoats for the Japanese
15 Daniels, Decision, 18. See also Conn, "The Decision to
Evacuate the Japanese from the Pacific Coast (1942)," 90-91.
16 tenBroek, et. al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution,
104-105; Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority (New York: Doubleday
and Co., 1962), 215; Alma Elizabeth Oberst, "The Policy of the
San Francisco News on the Evacuation and Relocation of the
Japanese during World War II" (Master's thesis, University of
California, Berkeley, 1964), 29; Girdner and Loftis, The Great
Betrayal, 17.
11 U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation
Authority, Impounded People: Japanese Americans in the Relocation
Centers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1946),8.
18 Miyamoto, "The Forced Evacuation of the Japanese Minority
during World War II," 12.
19 Carey McWilliams, "California and the Japanese," New
Republic, 2 March 1942, 295.
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bombing.,,2o These admonitions, combined with the lesson
Americans had learned from German persecution during World
War I, apparently affected West Coast attitudes in favor of
lenient treatment of the Japanese in the United States. 21
Despite the relative spirit of tolerance directed
toward American citizens of Japanese, German, and Italian
ancestry in the first few weeks after Pearl Harbor, anti-
Japanese sentiment began to increase in California during
January 1942. This hostility toward Japanese began in
December and increased throughout January. The public as
well as General DeWitt's fear of an attack on the Pacific
Coast increased after the Secretary of the Navy remarked
that he believed Japanese in Hawaii had assisted Japan's
attack. That fear of sabotage grew after Secretary of the
Navy Frank Knox stated that he though "'the most ffective
fifth column 22 work of the entire war was done in Hawaii,
20 Albert Blythe Turner, "The Origins and Development of the
War Relocation Authority" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1968),
microfilm, 18-19.
21 War Relocation Authority, Impounded People, 3, 8. For a
discussion of anti-German-American sentiment during World War I,
see David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American
societ¥ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 67-68.
2 The term "fifth column" refers to "secret sympathizers
and supporters of the enemy engaged in espionage, sabotage and
other subversive activities within defense lines." A. Marjorie
Taylor, compiler, The Language of World War II: Abbreviations,
Captions, Quotations, Slogans, Titles and Other Terms and
Phrases, revised and enlarged edition (New York: H.W. Wilson
Company, 1948), 80. See also Bob Kumamoto, "The Search for
Spies: American Counterintelligence and the Japanese American
Community 1931-1942," Amerasia 6 (Fall 1979): 53.
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with the possible exception of Norway.,,,23 Prior to
Secretary Knox's comment about a fifth column in Hawaii, at
least two West Coast newspapers printed articles about
supposed treachery by resident Japanese. 24
The spread of rumors of sabotage committed by Japanese
in Hawaii was the primary cause of the growth of hostility
toward resident Japanese on the West Coast. During the last
week of December 1941 survivors of the Pearl Harbor attack
began arriving in California. These men, women, and
children spread rumors of sabotage committed by Japanese in
Hawaii, such as cutting arrows pointing to Pearl Harbor in
sugar cane fields. Other rumors, including that some of the
downed Japanese pilots wore American high school or college
rings, also circulated in the weeks following Pearl
Harbor. 25
The press accurately expressed, represented, and even
fueled the anti-Japanese sentiment that slowly grew in the
23 William T. Peacock, "Secretary of Navy Blames Fifth
Columnists for The Raid; u.s. Napping," San Francisco Chronicle,
16 December 1941, p. 6. The FBI and Honolulu police department
later determined that the rumors of resident Japanese in Hawaii
aiding Japan's attack were false. Kiyotaka Izumi, "The Japanese
American evacuation of 1942," Journal of Asian and African
Studies 17 (1982): 268-269.
~4 u.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation
Authority, Wartime Exile: The Evacuation of the Japanese
Americans From the West Coast (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1946), 99.
25 Ibid., 103; Yoshiko Uchida, Desert Exile: The Uprooting
of a Japanese American Family (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1982), 53; Oberst, "The Policy of the San Francisco News,"
35; Kumamoto, "The Search for Spies," 70; Roucek, "American
Japanese, Pearl Harbor and World War II," 645.
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weeks following Pearl Harbor. 26 The December 22, 1941 issue
of Life magazine contained an article, "How To Tell Japs
From the Chinese," which provided readers with "a rule-of-
thumb from the anthropometric conformations that distinguish
friendly Chinese from enemy alien Japs." Apparently
citizens had unknowingly "victimize[d] allies [the Chinese]H
in expressing their anger toward the Japanese. According to
the article, people could distinguish between the two ethnic
groups partially by examining facial expressions, which were
more the product of culture than anthropology. "Chinese
wear rational calm of tolerant rationalists. Japs, like
General Tojo, show humorless intensity of ruthless
mysticism. H27 The presentation made the Chinese appear
amicable and the Japanese seem cold and unfeeling. The
article failed to encourage readers to be sure to
differentiate between Japanese Americans and friendly
Japanese aliens and actual Japanese enemies. This kind of
propagan a could do nothing but increase anti-J panese
feeling among Americans.
-' Gary Y. Okihiro and July Sly, "The Press, Japanese
Americans, and the Concentration Camps," Phylon 44 (1983): 71.
See also A.B. Turner, "The Origins and Development of the War
Relocation Authority," 19; Izumi, "The Japanese American
evacuation," 269, tenBroek, et. al., Prejudice, War and the
Constitution, 73; Bosworth, America's Concentration Camps, 101-
102.
~7 "How To Tell Japs From the Chinese," Life, 22 December
1941, 81.
20
Some Americans publicly revealed their distaste for the
Japanese as a race, failing to distinguish between their
fellow citizens and their Axis enemies. In response to
editorialist Herb Caen's advocacy of issuing Japanese and
Chinese Americans buttons so that people would not
discriminate against the Chinese, a San Francisco Chronicle
reader ridiculed the idea. ~Do you think for a minute that
a Chinese-American would wear the same button a Jap was
wearing?" The reader's letter also reveals that rumors
about Japanese Americans participating in the Pearl Harbor
attack did indeed affect some people's attitudes toward
American-born Japanese.
How about the "Japanese Americans" that led the
squadrons of planes in the Pearl Harbor affair
(graduates of our schools there) who were shot down
with class insignia on their persons. And you advocate
issuing pins to young Japs, what a laugh!28
Clearly, by the beginning of January, certain West Coast
citizens had already begun to distrust American citizens of
Japanese descent.
In a January 1942 Reader's Digest article, Stanley High
revealed that he believed that Japanese saboteurs lived on
the West Coast in arguing that these Japanese were prepared
to attack the United States. "They have assembled detailed
data on 0 r vital Pacific defenses. They possess the bases,
the equipment and the disciplined personnel with which to
28 San Francisco Chronicle, 4 January 1942, p. 4.
21
-strike either though sabotage or open acts of war."29 High
continued to describe the supplies with which resident
Japanese could commit sabotage, and further explained how a
Japanese alien on the West Coast had in his possession a
"several-hundred-page, ship-by-ship description of the
important units of the u.s. fleet" printed by the Japanese
navy and a map, "likewise printed in Japan," revealing a
"diagram showing in accurate detail the battle formation of
our Pacific fleet, presumably a well-guarded secret." 30
While he did not doubt the loyalty of American-born
Japanese, countless Nisei, High argued, experienced
tremendous pressure to serve the Emperor of Japan, referring
to dual citizenship, Japanese-language schools, and Buddhist
and Shinto temples as means of inculcating the duty and
desire to serve Japan into these American citizens of
Japanese ancestry. The fact that the United States
government had not taken some type of action against these
potential saboteurs, High asserted, only allowed them to
become more prepared for an attack on the United States. 31
For any readers who may have had the slightest doubt of the
loyalty of America's Japanese, this article could have
29 Stanley High,
Digest, January 1942,
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 13-15.
"Japanese Saboteurs in Our Midst," Reader's
11.
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-easily reinforced any kind of paranoia and opposition to the
Japanese presence on the Pacific Coast.
The release of the Report on the Attack Upon Pearl
Harbor by Japanese Armed Forces on January 25, 1942
compounded the growing suspicion of sabotage performed by
resident Japanese. This report, known as the Roberts Report
because Associate Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts
chaired the committee, was the result of a presidential
executive order to determine if dereliction of duty had
contributed to the success of Japan's attack. 32 Roberts and
the four other members of the committee blamed espionage
efforts centered on the Japanese consulate and the
military's ineffective counterespionage efforts for the
success of Japan's attack. 33 Although the Roberts Report
did not directly accuse resident Japanese of facilitating
the attack, the report implied that Hawaii's Japanese had
participated in the effort. 34 The release of this
information immediately affected public opinion, for the
report "confirmed the 'menace' of the Japanese
population. ,,35
3c Executive Order Number 8983, Federal Register, 20
December 1941, p. 6569.
33 tenBroek, et. al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution,
73; Girdner and Loftis, The Great Betrayal, 19. The Roberts
Report is published in Report on the Attack Upon Pearl Harbor By
Japanese Armed Forces, 77th Congress, 2d. sess. (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942).
34 Girdner and Loftis, The Great Betrayal, 20.
3, Izumi, "The Japanese American evacuation," 269.
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-Even before the release of the Roberts Report, General
DeWitt clearly stated that he believed that Japanese enemy
aliens were cooperating with the enemy. General Gullion
asked the lieutenant general if he thought that enemy aliens
on the coast were working with "some higher power
outside. ,,36 DeWitt responded affirmatively and later
asserted his belief that those participating in the ship-to-
shore and shore-to-ship communication were involved in
attacking American ships in the Pacific Ocean. Although
optimistic about the Justice Department's cooperation in
conducting contraband raids, DeWitt would not become
complacent. The general told Gullion that simply because no
instances of sabotage had occurred on the West Coast thus
far did not mean that sabotage could or would not occur
somewhe re . 37
By the end of January 1942, General DeWitt questione
the loyalty of the resident Japanese, both citizen and
alien, thus echoing the public's concern about the Japanese
presence on the West Coast. In a conversation with Major
Karl R. Bendetsen, the head of the Aliens Division of the
Provost Marshal General's Office, DeWitt said that public
sentiment was "crystallizing very rapidly" on the oast and
36 Transcript of telephone conversation, General Gullion and
General DeWitt, 24 January 1942, Daniels, American Concentration
Camps, vol. 2.
:31 Ibid.
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-that people were suspicious of all Japanese. 38 By this time
DeWitt clearly doubted the sincerity of American Japanese
who declared their loyalty. "There are going to be a lot of
Japs who are going to say, 'Oh, yes, we want to go, we're
good Americans and we want to do everything you say', but
those are the fellows I suspect the most."39 Bendetsen
agreed. When discussing the possible resettlement of enemy
aliens and dual citizens, the commanding general said he
included "all Japanese who are native-born or foreign-born"
in a category with German and Italian alien enemies. 4o
While in a later conversation he clarified that he would
include Italian dual citizens in the group which the
government would evacuate, DeWitt said he considered the
Japanese, both aliens and citizens, the most dangerous
group, then Germans, and finally the Italians. 41 Although
he apparently distrusted all Japanese, including Japanese
Americans, he knew he could not legally remove or imprison
American citizens simply because he believed they posed a
threat to his command. His ideas changed as time progressed
38 Transcript of telephone conversation, General DeWitt and
Major Bendetsen, 30 January 1942, Daniels, American Concentration
Camps, vol. 2.
39 Ibid.
40 Transcript of telephone conversation, General DeWitt and
Major Bendetsen, 31 January 1942, Daniels, American Concentration
Camps, vol. 2.
41 Transcript of telephone conversation, General DeWitt and
Major Bendetsen, 31 January 1942, Daniels, American Concentration
Camps, vol. 2.
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-and as he slowly accepted the opinions of the public,
California politicians, and Major Bendetsen.
Public opinion in favor of removing the Japanese from
the West Coast had indeed crystallized by the beginning of
February 1942, and DeWitt could not have ignored the demand
for moving the Japanese away from the coast. Francis Biddle
later recalled intense pressure under which DeWitt lived and
worked during the last weeks before President Roosevelt
signed Executive Order Number 9066: "Everyone was after him
on the coast to get rid of the Japs-- . . . the California
Joint Immigration Committee, the Native Sons and Daughters
of the Golden West, the Western Growers Protective
Association, the California Farm Bureau Federation,U the Los
Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the American Legion, and the
newspapers. 42 DeWitt and military officials ould not have
ignored such pressure and the growing anti-J panese
sentiment.
California politicians, possibly in response to th
pressure of their constituencies, emphasized to General
DeWitt the importance of evacuating all of the Japanese from
the West Coast. Numerous politicians contacted the War
Department and the Justice Department to urge government
42 Biddle, In Brief Authority, 217. See also War Relocation
Authority, Impounded People, 18. Grodzins's Americans Betrayed
is the best work explaining the influence of such pressure
groups.
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-officials to protect the country by removing all Japanese
from the West Coast. 43 The two men who had direct contact
with the commanding general and had the greatest influence
on him and his subsequent decision to relocate Americans of
Japanese ancestry were California Governor Culbert Olson and
California Attorney General Earl Warren.
Governor Olson expressed various sentiments to DeWitt
that must have affected the general's decision to support
the evacuation of Japanese Americans and Japanese aliens
from the Pacific Coast. Like many California politicians,
Olson at first advocated treating the Japanese with
tolerance,44 but by late January, the governor changed his
position on the relocation of California's Japanese. Anti-
Japanese groups expressed their concerns about sabotage and
other subversive activities to Olson. Claiming that he had
received letters supporting the removal of all Japanese from
California, the governor told General DeWitt that he feared
citizens would "'take things into their own hands'u if the
federal government did not remove all Japanese from
Cali fornia. 45
43 See Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 2 .
• 4 tenBroek, et. al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution,
200. See also Roger Daniels and Harry H.L. Kitano, American
Racism: Exploration of the Nature of Prejudice (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970),58.
45 Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, 107, 276.
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-In a radio address on the night of February 4, the
governor, though he discouraged vigilantism, appeared to
reverse his moderate stance on fair treatment of the
Japanese in California. Not only did Olson accept and
perpetuate the idea that race was a factor in determining
people's loyalty, he also implied that the Japanese, unlike
Germans and Italians, had to prove their loyalty to the
United States "by cooperating in the perfection and
execution of plans that will ensure" the protection of the
state and nation. 46 He also announced that the government
planned to revoke California Department of Agriculture
licenses to Japanese distributors of agricultural foodstuffs
because most of the distributors were aliens. The state
would also deny Japanese aliens such licenses in the future.
Furthermore, the government would "investigate and use
discretion in issuing licenses to any of the Japanese
produce distributors."47 Olson revealed a general feeling
of suspicion and distrust toward the entire Japanese
population. He concluded his address by again asserting
that the Japanese had to prove their loyalty: "It is
obvious, therefore, that all loyal Japanese citizens must,
when called upon, show their loyalty in cooperating in the
execution of" the plans which military, federal, and state
46 Culbert L. Olson, transcript of radio address, 4 February
1942, Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
41 Ibid.; emphasis added.
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-officials were currently developing. 48 While expressing his
hope that the government would not have to remove all
Japanese adults to the interior of the country, Olson
certainly did not help reduce fears about a potential
Japanese menace. By implying that Japanese Americans were
disloyal, the governor's speech instead reinforced
stereotypical and hysterical ideas about the Japanese living
in California.
Like many other politicians within the state, such as
Los Angeles Mayor Fletcher Bowron and San Francisco Mayor
Angelo Rossi, California Attorney General Earl Warren urged
General DeWitt to evacuate the Japanese from the West Coast.
Initially cautious of advocating exclusion and relocation,
by February 1942, Warren favored removing the Japanese, whom
he perceived as a menace to the safety of California.
Although a member of the Native Sons of the Golden West,49 a
California nativist group, the state attorney general
appears to have favored evacuation of Japanese Americans
because he believed they constituted a potential sabotage
threat and not necessarily because he hated the race.
Attorney General Warren believed that Japanese land
holdings and settlements revealed a Japanese plan to commit
sabotage. On January 23, 1942, the State of California
48 Ibid.
49 A.B. Turner, "The Origins and Development of the War
Relocation Authority," 24.
29
-began investigations of possible illegalSO land holdings of
Japanese aliens, an action which Warren "demanded as a
precautionary measure against possible fifth columnist
activi ty and sabotage attempts. "Sl The attorney general
explained that Japanese occupied land close to strategic
industries, including war industries, as well as military
installations, and that in certain areas of the state
dominated the agricultural industry. Warren believed that
that it is more than circumstance that after certain
manufacturing plants should be entirely surrounded by
the Select Committee Investigating National Defense
[had] been violated--either openly or
"It seems strange to us that airplane
the investigation of Japanese land holdings would "disclose
land] act .
in California.
numerous instances in which the almost forgotten [alien
through some evasive device."s2 He later testified before
his ideas regarding the location of Japanese land holdings
Migration, headed by John H. Tolan, and clearly explained
Japanese land occupancies." He continued, "It seems to us
Government air bases were established Japanese undertook
farming operations in close proximity to them." Warren
added, "Many of our vital facilities, and most of our
highways are just pocketed by Japanese ownerships that could
so Illegal according to the 1920 Alien Land Law.
S1 "State Will Investigate Jap 'Owners'," San Francisco
Chronicle, 24 January 1942, p. 1.
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-be of untold danger to us in time of stress. u53 The
attorney general obviously believed that Japanese land
holdings, especially those near military and industrial
installations, proved that the Japanese posed a threat to
California's safety.
Despite what Warren and other Californians may have
believed, the Japanese had not intentionally settled around
military and industrial areas. The Japanese lived near
strategic locations such as airports, railroads, and
highways because no one else had wanted to live in those
areas. Japanese farmers often settled on the edges of
cities to be closer to markets, and many lived near highways
so they could sell their produce at vegetable stands. Many
Japanese who resided around military installations had
actually lived there long before they became military
sites. 54 Clearly, lack of understanding of historical
factors and anti-Japanese sentiment only served to increase
some people's distrust of the Japanese.
52 Ibid.
~3 Richard Polenberg, ed., America at War: The Horne Front,
1941-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), 103.
S4 Trisha Bantly, "I Am A Citizen," Pacific Historian 13
(Winter 1969): 14; Stanton B Turner, "Japanese-American
Internment at Tule Lake, 1942-1946," Journal of the Shaw
Historical Library 2 (1987): 6-7; Eric J. Sundquist, "The
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In late January, Warren publicly declared that he
believed Japanese residents posed a threat to the safety of
the state and that no one could tell which Japanese were
to distinguish between dangerous enemy aliens, of which we
situation in California may well be another Achilles' heel
"'I have concluded that the Japaneseloyal or disloyal.
repetition of Pearl Harbor.' "55 In the same public
genuinely loyal to the U.8.,"56 Warren thus not only
statement, the attorney general asserted, "'It's impossible
are sure there are many here, and Japanese American citizens
of our whole civilian defense efforts. Unless something is
done about it,'" he warned, "'it may possibly bring a
revealed his belief that saboteurs were living in
California, but also implied that people could not determine
the loyalty of the Japanese residents of the state, an idea
upon which he later expounded. When asked if there was a
way to distinguish loyal Japanese from the disloyal, the
attorney general replied, "We believe that when we are
dealing with the Caucasian race we have methods that will
test the loyalty of them," and continued, "and we believe
that we an, in dealing with the Germans and the Italians,
',S "More About the Crackdown on Axis Aliens; Right to Clear
All Strategic Areas Asked," San Francisco Chronicle, 31 January
1942, p. 4. See also Bozik, "Rhetorical Decision-Making," 110;
Grodzins, American Betrayed, 93-94; Takaki, Strangers From A
Different Shore, 359.
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-arrive at some fairly sound conclusions because of our
knowledge of the way they live in the community and have
lived for many years. u57 In regard to the Japanese, Warren
added, "we are in an entirely different field and we cannot
form any opinion that we believe to be sound. u58 The
attorney general asserted that the lack of understanding of
Japanese culture and language prevented government officials
from being able to determine Japanese loyalty, so he
supported the proposal to remove all Japanese residents from
the West Coast.
To address the supposed threat of sabotage from within
the state, Warren convened a meeting of the state's chiefs
of police, sheriffs, and district attorneys on February 2. 59
The attorney general declared that California was "wide open
. to any kind of fifth olumn activity and to any kind
of sabotage. u6o The law enforcement officers at th me ting
". "More About the Crackdown on Axis Aliens; Right to Clear
All strategic Areas Asked," San Francisco Chronicle, 31 January
1942/ p. 4.
57 Polenberg, America at War, 102. See also McWilliams,
Prejudice, 118; S. Turner, "Japanese-American Internment at Tule
Lake, 1942 to 1946," 6; Robert Arden Wilson and Bill Hosokawa,
East to America: A History of the Japanese in the United States,
1st ed. (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980), 197.
',8 Polenberg, America at War, 102; Wilson and Hosokawa, East
to America, 197.
"J Bosworth, America / s Concentration Camps / 65; Wartime
Exile, 113.
60 Proceedings: Conference of Sheriffs and District
Attorneys Called by Attorney General Warren on the Subject of
Alien Land Law Enforcement, p. 3/ U.S. Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Papers of the Commission
on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Part 1/
Numerical File Archive (Frederick, MD: University Publications of
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-voted to request that the federal government remove all the
Japanese aliens from a two-hundred-mile-wide strip of the
California coast, and decided "to launch a fresh
investigation of land titles and file civil suits for
escheat to the State of land which they should consider to
be held illegally by Japanese. u61 Warren "officially opened
a campaign against law violating aliens and citizens, and
against subversive organizations. u62 Although he warned
against hysteria and vigilantism, Warren told those
attending the meeting "that every alien Japanese should be
considered in the light of a potential fifth columnist. u63
The fact that Japanese had not committed any acts of
sabotage did not convince Warren that they were loyal to the
United States, but instead reinforced the attorney general's
suspicion that the Japanese were indeed disloyal and waiting
for the most opportune moment to execute their subversive
plans. In the February 2 meeting with California's district
attorneys and sheriffs, Warren said that the lack of
sabotage seemed "as though it is a studied effort not to
America, 1984), microfilm reel 9, frame 583 (hereafter cited
CWRIC followed by the reel then frame number); see also Wartime
Exile, 113.
61 Wartime Exile, 113; Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, 93.
62 "More on the New Bans on State Aliens," San Francisco
Chronicle, 3 February 1942, p. 6.
63 Ibid.; see also Proceedings: Conference of Sheriffs and
District Attorneys Called by Attorney General Warren on the
Subject of Alien Land Law Enforcement, p. 7, CWRIC 9: 587.
34
-have any until the zero hour arrives. u64 He later told the
Tolan Committee that he perceived the lack of fifth column
activities in California as "'the most ominous sign of our
whole situation.' ,,65 He believed that Americans were" 'ju t
being lulled into a false sense of security and that the
only reason . [they had not] had disaster in California
[was] because it . [had] been timed for a
different date,'" and that when an attack occurred, it would
"'mean disaster both to California and to'U the United
States. 66
On February 7, Earl Warren "attended a meeting of the
California Joint Immigration Committee and announced his
opinion that the military should handle the Japanese
situation. u67 The attorney general told the committee that
he believed the political aspects of the Japanese threat to
California were too complex for state offi ials to handle.
"'There is only one group in the last analysis that can
protect this State from the Japanese situation and that is
the armed forces of this government.'" Warren then
suggested that the committee "'urge the military command in
~~ Proceedings: Conference of Sheriffs and District
Attorneys, CWRIC 9: 585. See also Bosworth, America's
Concentration Camps, 49; Girdner and Loftis, The Great Betrayal,
26-27.
C:' Iiyama, "American Con entration Camps," 27.
EE Ibid.
~7 Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, 96. See also A.B. Turner,
"The Origins and Development of the War Relocation Authority,"
25.
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-this area to do the things that are obviously essential to
the security of the State.,uG8 In addition to his previous
public comments about his fears regarding potential
sabotage, the attorney general's comments at the meeting
must have resulted in further pressure on General DeWitt to
remove the Japanese from the West Coast.
In a February 11 meeting in San Francisco with Los
Angeles Mayor Fletcher Bowron and Tom Clark of the Justice
Department, Attorney General Warren expressed his opinion to
a newspaper reporter regarding the military's function in
protecting California to General DeWitt. G9 After the
meeting the attorney general asserted that the government
had to do something about the Japanese on the coast, and
declared that if the federal government believed "there
[was] grave danger" in California "'we ought to do
everything we can to make the area secure.' ,,70 Warren
stated his opinion that the military, implying of course
General DeWitt, should be responsible for ensuring the
safety of the coast. "'But that should be a military
problem. The army should say who's to be admitted and who
isn't. The question of citizenship shouldn't be involved.
68 Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, 96. See also Bosworth,
America's Concentration Camps, 72; Oberst, "The Policy of the San
Francisco News," 26-27.
69 Wartime Exile, 125.
70 "Martial Law Moves Closer To California," San Francisco
Chronicle, 12 February 1942, p. 1.
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-Every person, citizen or alien, should be willing to co-
operate.' II 71 While Warren may not have expressed those
exact sentiments to DeWitt, the general was aware of public
opinion and it is therefore probable that he also knew the
attorney general's opinions.
Warren's conclusions apparently reveal not only his
paranoia but also his ignorance regarding the history and
culture of certain California residents who he, as a public
official, was supposed to represent. As state attorney
general, he should have also been concerned with the civil
rights of the Japanese Americans, yet he was not. In the
light of his later role as champion of civil liberties was a
Supreme Court justice, Warren's role in the Japanese
exclusion decision is quite perplexing. Scholars have
offered an explanation for this blatant inconsistency in
Warren's ideas. He was a politician and planned on running
for governor in the next election. 72 Warren realized that
to succeed politically, one often has to make compromises.
A judge simply has to uphold principles. 73 Thus, it is
possible that Warren advocated the removal of the Japanese
from the West Coast because he wanted to please his
11 Ibid.
7" U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians, Personal Justice Denied, 96.
7~ G. Edward White, "The Unacknowledged Lesson: Earl Warren
and the Japanese Relocation Controversy,n Virginia Quarterly
Review 55 (Autumn 1974): 623-624.
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-constituents and gain political support. Regardless of his
reasons for supporting Japanese exclusion, whether racial or
political, Warren advocated removal, and his ideas clearly
affected General DeWitt's opinions.
By provoking paranoia and racial animosity toward the
Japanese with racially charged comments and innuendoes about
the threat of sabotage, Governor Culbert Olson and Attorney
General Earl Warren, possibly unknowingly, created and
promoted a general attitude supporting relocation. By
virtue of their esteemed political positions and presumed
more informed understanding of California's residents,
DeWitt and his staff very likely accepted these local
politicians' opinions and recommendations as credible.
Two months after declaring that evacuating United
States citizens was "damned nonsense," the lieutenant
general accepted the removal of potentially dangerous groups
of people as one of the most important means of ensuring
that enemy aliens, saboteurs, or fifth columnists would not
compromise the security of the Pacific Coast. Whether he
realized it or not, public opinion regarding the Japanes
and California politicians' ideas about the threat all
Japanese posed to the state clearly altered DeWitt's
willingness to evacuate Japanese Americans along with all
other Axis nationals from the Pacific Coast.
38
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-Just as the influence of certain politicians is clearly
visible in his recommendation to Secretary of War Stimson
suggesting that the Army exclude Japanese Americans and all
enemy aliens from the West Coast, so too is Bendetsen's
influence, if for no other reason than the fact that DeWitt
actually advocated a mass evacuation after he had so
adamantly opposed the idea in December 1941. DeWitt
distrusted the Japanese, but he also knew that he could not
interfere with the rights of American citizens, whether they
were Japanese or not. Only after Major Bendetsen convinced
him that the Army could justifiably remove the Japanese, did
DeWitt send his recommendation to the War Department.
As evident in his final report to the Secretary of War,
the lieutenant general advocated the evacuation and
relocation of Japanese aliens and citizens because he
believed they posed a threat to the West Coast, which he had
the duty to defend. DeWitt decided to advocate the
evacuation and relocation of people he perceived as threats
to the Western Defense Command; he suggested that the
government remove Japanese aliens and citizens, German
aliens, Italian aliens, and other people the government
considered subversive or potential saboteurs from the West
Coast. 74
74 Ibid.
Constitution,
See also tenBroek, et. al., Prejudice, War and the
110.
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-The general believed that an enemy attack on the West
Coast "would probably be accomplished by 'a violent outburst
of coordinated and controlled sabotage' among the Japanese
population."75 He also believed that enemy aliens on shore
signaled enemy ships in the Pacific Ocean. 76 After learning
that the FBI found "guns, ammunition, explosives, radio
[sic], short-wave, and other contraband," and in addition
that "a Jap [had] been authorized to keep 2000 pounds
of dynamite to sell to farmers, and all of it was gone
together with 3000 detonators,"7? the lieutenant general
certainly believed that the West Coast Japanese planned some
form of sabotage. He also believed that "Sabotage of vital
installations throughout the Western Defense Command" could
and probably would occur. 78 These facts and events made
DeWitt even more suspicious of the Japanese as a whole, so
he could not allow such a potentially dangerous group of
people remain in a vital defense area.
Although he did not openly acknowledge it, DeWitt
apparently adopted many of Earl Warren's ideas for the
7~ Conn, "The Decision to Evacuate the Japanese from the
West Coast (19421,H 94.
76 Transcript of telephone conversation between General
Gullion and General DeWitt, 24 January 1942, Daniels, American
Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
/I Transcript of telephone conversation between General
DeWitt and General Gullion, 5 February 1942, Daniels, American
Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
/8 Memorandum to the Secretary of War from DeWitt, 13
February 1942, Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
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I,
-lieutenant general's memorandum recommending evacuation to
the Secretary of War. At times, the general's reasons
almost exactly resemble Warren's pro-evacuation arguments.
Like Warren, DeWitt clearly believed that the strategic
placement of Japanese farms and markets around important war
industries revealed a Japanese plan to commit sabotage.
Even before focusing on the Japanese in California, though,
DeWitt knew that aliens living near war industries presented
a dangerous situation. The general told General George
Marshall that one of his main concerns as head of the
Western Defense Command was "getting them [aliens] away from
around these aircraft factories and other places. ff79 In
describing the disposition of the Japanese in California,
the lieutenant general specifically mentioned that Japanese
markets and "truck farms are contiguous to the vital
aircraft industry concentration in and around Los Angeles,"
and that the Japanese "live in large numbers in and about
San Francisco, now a vast staging area for the war in the
Pacific, a point at which the nation's lines of
communication and supply converge. ,,80
DeWitt also justified his recommendation for evacuating
the Japanese with another argument Warren had used: no one
7, Transcript of telephone conversation between General
Marshall and General DeWitt, 2(?] February 1942, Daniels,
American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
[j Memorandum to the Secretary of War from DeWitt, 13
February 1942, Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
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could determine the loyalty of the Japanese. In a
conversation with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy,
DeWitt quoted a section from a memorandum he was going to
send to General Gullion which revealed his attitude
regarding race and loyalty. "The problem of the alien
German and alien Italian, while a difficult one, has not the
same features as the Japanese problem and can be handled
without consideration of their removal. uBI Japanese aliens
and citizens, though, were dangerous. DeWitt had clearly
come to believe that race determined 10yaltyB2:
The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many
second and third generation Japanese born on United
States soil, possessed of United States citizenship,
have become "Americanized", the racial strains are
undiluted. To conclude otherwise is to expect that
children born of white parents on Japanese soil sever
all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects,
ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a
war against the nation of their parents. That Japan is
allied with German and Italy in this struggle is no
ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from
assimilation by convention as he is, though born and
raised in the United States, will not turn against this
nation when the final test of loyalty comes. It,
therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coastal
Frontier over 112,000 potential enemies, of Japanese
extraction, are at large today.B3
,.~ Transcript of telephone conversation between General
DeWitt and John McCloy, 3 February 1942, Daniels, American
Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
~~ U.S. Committee on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians, Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 8.
83 Memorandum to the Secretary of War from DeWitt, 13
February 1942, Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
See also Takaki, Strangers From A Different Shore, 391; Personal
Justice Denied, 8.
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General DeWitt and Earl Warren's racial assumptions that
there was no way to determine Japanese loyalty thus led to
the removal and eventual internment of Japanese aliens and
citizens.
General DeWitt, like Earl Warren, asserted that the
lack of sabotage was a sure indication that sabotage would
occur. The general told Gullion that he suspected shore-to-
ship and ship-to-shore communication between enemy agents in
the Pacific and on the coast and added that "the fact that
nothing has happened so far is well let me say more or less
omitable [ominous], in that I feel that in view of the fact
that we have had no sporatic [sic] attempts at sabotage that
they can still be exercised somewhere. u84 The Western
Defense Commander used the same convoluted logic in his
memorandum to Secretary of War Stimson. 8s General DeWitt
thus accepted Earl Warren's perplexing reasoning that no
sabotage implied that enemy agents were waiting for the most
opportune moment to execute their plans. In order to
guarantee that no acts of sabotage occurred, the lieutenant
,'~ Transcript of telephone conversation between General
Gullion and General DeWitt, 24 January 1942, Daniels, American
Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
85 Memorandum to the Secretary of War from DeWitt, 13
February 1942, Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
See also Doris Kearns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time: Franklin and
Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1994), 321; McWilliams, Prejudice, 110;
tenBroek, et. al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution, 92.
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general recommended the removal of these potential
saboteurs.
General DeWitt and thus the military's conclusion that
California's Japanese population constituted a safety threat
resulted from public opinion regarding the Japanese and from
meetings with specific politicians who believed that the
Japanese were disloyal and expressed such opinions to the
commanding general. Because of rumors of Japanese in Hawaii
aiding Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, attacks on American
ships by the Japanese off the West Coast, and the assumed
inability to determine the loyalty of Japanese living in the
United States, General DeWitt became very paranoid about the
possibility of subversive acts occurring in his theater of
operations. The general's paranoia resulted in his
accepting rumors as facts and possibiliti s as
probabilities.
Determining DeWitt's exact attitude toward the Japan se
population and his willingness or lack thereof to forcibly
remove them from the West Coast is complicated by the fact
that he vacillated on the issue between December 1941 and
February 1942. Though he originally opposed interfering
with American citizens, he also believed that members of the
Japanese community planned to commit sabotage and were
actively involved in communicating with Japanese agents in
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the Pacific. On more than one occasion, the general implied
that he favored evacuating Japanese Americans as well as all
enemy aliens from the Western Defense Command, but he al 0
made repeated statements that he did not advocate mass
evacuation. At times, DeWitt's opinion appeared to change
depending on to whom he spoke. What does appear clear,
however, is that by the end of January 1942, DeWitt
distrusted all of the Japanese, aliens and citizens, yet
knew that distrust did not warrant violating the rights of
American citizens. He therefore may have wanted to remove
Japanese Americans from the West Coast but could not devise
a reason for evacuation. When Major Bendetsen developed a
plan that would allow the exclusion of all Japanese from the
coast, General DeWitt accepted and supported the plan.
Once DeWitt believed that removing the Japanese from
his command would help ensure the safety of the Pacific
Coast, the Army had to formulate a plan to justify the
removal. Before t e Western Defense Commander wrote his
February 13 memorandum, which would not only reveal Earl
Warren's but also Major Bendetsen's influence, to the
secretary of War, however, military officials in Was ington,
D.C. had already realized that the government would indeed
evacuate Japanese Ameri ans. DeWitt may not have known it
at the time, but War Department officials simply waited for
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the general's recommendation before proceeding with the
exclusion plan which Major Bendetsen had initially
formulated and refined since the beginning of February.
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CHAPTER THREE
DEWITT AND BENDETSEN'S PLAN
Amidst the paranoia and fear of imminent danger on the
West Coast which characterized the first two months
following Pearl Harbor, Major Karl R. Bendetsen formulated
and indirectly initiated a plan to exclude all Japanese from
the Western Defense Command. Bendetsen gradually realized
that if the Western Defense Commander recommended the
removal of all persons that the military or federal
government in general considered dangerous on the basis of
military necessity, the government could circumvent the
legal complications of violating American citizens' rights.
Karl Robin Bendetsen was born on October 11, 1907 in
Aberdeen, Washington to Albert M. and Anna Bende sen. He
received his bachelor of arts degree from Stanford
University in 1929 and his bachelor of laws degree in 1932,
and was a member of the California, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Washington, D.C., and United States Supreme Court bars. He
practiced law in Aberdeen from 1932 to 1940, at which point
he began active service in the Army, where he served in the
office of the Judge Advocate General. 1
"Bendetsen, Karl Robin," Supplement to Who's Who in
America, 45th ed. (Wilmette, IL: Marquis Who's Who, 1989), 89;
Alfonso A. Narvaez, "Karl R. Bendetsen, 81, Executive and High-
Ranking U.S. Official," New York Times 30 June 1989, p. A16.
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In 1942, Bendetsen served as the head of the Aliens
Division of the Provost Marshal General, a job in which his
primary function was to act as an unofficial liaison between
the War Department and the Western Defense Command. 2 His
role as liaison was very important in the overall evacuation
decision. As the only person totally aware of the
discussions occurring in the War Department and the Western
Defense Command, he could influence his superiors in each
department and possibly even manipulate facts and people to
produce the effects he desired.
Both Generals DeWitt and Gullion depended on the major
for information regarding alien enemies on the coast and the
War Department's assessment of the situation. General
DeWitt was obviously not in regular contact with the
Secretary of War, so Major Bendetsen relayed any crucial
information coming from the War Department to the Western
Defense Commander. Bendetsen's superiors in Washington
likewise depended on him to assess events on the West Coast
and pass on information that they needed to know. Like any
superior officer, General Gullion relied on Bendetsen to
provide him with information that he could not get himself.
On more than one occasion, while talking to civilian and
military officials, Gullion admitted that he did not possess
Z Glen Kitayama, "Bendetsen, Karl R. (1907-1989), /I Japanese
American History, 112.
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the knowledge or understanding of various aspects of the
alien control effort and either asked Bendetsen to explain
certain things to him or allowed the official to speak
directly to the major. 3 Thus, Bendetsen was in the position
to influence greatly the opinions and decisions of his
superiors. One can expect that Assistant Secretary of War
McCloy and possibly even Secretary of War Stimson also
accepted Bendetsen's opinions and suggestions, for his role
as liaison between the Provost Marshal General's Office and
Western Defense Command made him appear to be the person
most informed of the happenings in both departments.
Major Bendetsen's plan to remove the Japanese from the
West Coast apparently resulted from his belief that the
efforts of the Justice Department were not and would not be
sufficient to ensure the safety of the West Coast. As early
as January 3, 1942, when General DeWitt clearly opposed any
idea of interfering with Japanese-American citizens,
Bendetsen recommended that the lieutenant general request
presidential authorization to transfer authority of alien
control from the Attorney General to the War Department.
Bendetsen wanted the military to establish restricted areas
from which the army could exclude enemy aliens, and believed
j See transcript of telephone conversation between General
DeWitt, General Gullion and Major Bendetsen, 1(?) february 1942,
CWRIC 4: 141, and transcript of telephone conversation between
Mr. Breckenridge Long and General Gullion, 2 February 1942,
Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
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-that the military commanders should have the responsibility
to evict and arrest those who violated the restrictions. 4
Toward the end of January, Bendetsen again expressed doubt
in the efficacy of Department of Justice measures. Upon
hearing that a representative from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had contacted General DeWitt about the FBI's
efforts at enemy alien control, the major said "of course,
you cannot tell until after he's had a chance to actually
operate under them whether they'll be satisfactory.us The
FBI had not yet implemented its plans and Bendetsen already
questioned if they would work. Such an attitude reveals his
distrust of Department of Justice measures designed to
decrease the likelihood of sabotage occurring on the West
Coast. Bendetsen obviously believed that the military was
the only branch of government which could effectively
protect the country from the internal and external threa of
attack. His comment also indicates that he had possibly
already begun to try to convince the Western Defense
Commander to endorse a plan for evacuating all of the
Japanese from the Pacific Coast.
As the liaison between the War Department and Western
Defense Command, Bendetsen knew exactly what officials in
4 Memorandum to General DeWitt from Major Bendetsen, 3
January 1942, CWRIC 2: 122-123.
5 Transcript of telephone conversation between General
DeWitt and Major Bendetsen, 22 January 1942, 2:30 p.m., Daniels,
American Concentration Camps, vol. 2; see also CWRIC 5: 819-821.
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Washington and San Francisco debated regarding the problem
of Japanese aliens and citizens. He was also keenly aware
of the opposition of members of the Justice Department to
interfering with American citizens. United States Attorney
General Francis Biddle and Assistant Attorney General James
Rowe, among other members of the Department of Justice,
refused to support or assist any attempts to infringe on the
rights of Japanese-American citizens. Edward J. Ennis, head
of the Alien Enemy Control Unit, told military officials
that moving Americans of Japanese ancestry was both wrong
and unnecessary, but the military said removal should occur
in order to protect the West Coast. 6 This pattern recurred
every time the military suggested removing Japanese
Americans from the coast.
As one might expect or hope, Attorney General Biddle
was a particularly vocal opponent of the military's desire
to remove Japanese Americans from certain areas along the
Pacific Coast. He surely believed that Department of
Justice control efforts would be effective in significantly
reducing the danger which alien enemies and other subversive
elements posed on the West Coast. Biddle also knew that
neither the Justice nor War Departments could interfere with
American citizens without violating their constitutional
6 Interview with Edward J. Ennis from The Japanese American
Relocation Reviewed, Earl Warren Oral History Project (Berkeley:
University of California, 1969), 20 December 1972, CWRIC 5: 23.
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rights. On more than one occasion, Biddle forthrightly told
Army officials that neither he nor his department would
support the military's idea of a mass evacuation of Japanese
citizens. On February 2, Bendetsen relayed what Attorney
General Biddle said during a conference the previous day.
"He states that his Department will have nothing to do with
it [mass evacuation] .n7 A few days later Biddle told
General Gullion that the Department of Justice would have
"nothing whatsoever to do with any interference with
citizens, whether they are Japanese or not." S This comment
angered Gullion, who rhetorically asked Biddle if the
Justice Department would not help the military "if the Army,
the man on the ground, determine it is a military necessity
to move citizens, Jap citizens. n9 Assistant Secretary of
War McCloy also responded to Biddle's staunch adheren to
the Constitution by saying that the attorney general was
"putting a wall street lawyer in a helluva box, but if it is
a question of the safety of the country [and] the
constitution. . why the constitution is just a scrap of
paper to me. nlO Some members of the War Department were
7 Memorandum for the Secretary, General Staff from Major
Bendetsen, 2 February 1942, Daniels, American Concentration
Camps, vol. 2.
Retyped transcript of telephone conversation between
General Gullion and General Clark, 4 February 1942, Daniels,
American Concentration Camps, vol. 2; see also CWRIC 34: 180-184.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
52
clearly willing to violate the rights of certain American
citizens to ensure the safety of the nation. The conflict
over the Department of Justice's unwillingness to assist the
Army in removing Japanese Americans continued until the
military found a way to circumvent the constitutional aspect
of evacuating citizens.
Knowing of the Justice Department's reticence at
interfering with citizens, Bendetsen, whom historian Roger
Daniels often refers to as "the lawyer in uniform,N realized
that if the military really wanted to remove the Japanese
Americans, the Army would have to develop a plan that would
not overtly subvert the Constitution and therefore upset
Department of Justice officials. Ironically, Bendetsen's
conversations with some members of the Justice Department
apparently provided the foundation for the explanation the
Army would use to justify evacuating Japanese citizens.
The debate over the Japanese presence on Bainbridge
Island in Puget Sound not only illustrated the tensions
between military officials and Justice Department officials,
but also provided some basis for Bendetsen's evacuation
plan. The Department of the Navy and the general public
wanted all Japanese, alien and citizen, removed from the
island. 11 General DeWitt, who at this time clearly
11 Digest of Telephone Conversation Between General DeWitt
and Major Bendetsen on January 28, 1942, 12:15 p.m., Daniels,
American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
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-distrusted the West Coast Japanese, said he wanted all enemy
aliens and all Japanese excluded from the island because of
the vital military installations, namely a shipbuilding
installation and the aircraft warning service, located
there. 12 Two days later, DeWitt, evidently very concerned
about the alien presence on the island, told Bendetsen that
he hoped the major would "press the evacuationU in his
meeting with Attorney General Biddle, Assistant Secretary of
War McCloy, and Provost Marshal General Gullion. 13
Knowing that the Justice Department was handling alien
cases, Bendetsen asked Rowe if the Department of Justice
could exclude all citizens except "those who are not of
Japanese extractionU from certain areas on Bainbridge
Island. Rowe responded that the Justice Department did not
have the jurisdiction for su h a matter, but suggested that
the Navy might. Because of the ircraft warning service's
location on the island, Rowe said that the Army could just
restrict people's access to the area. "The Departm nt [of
Justice] just can't tell citizens to get off. Maybe if you
can do it as a military problem some way.ul4 Rowe's
12 Transcript of telephone conversation between Major
Bendetsen and General DeWitt, 29 January 1942, 12:25 p.m.,
Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
13 Transcript of telephone conversation between General
DeWitt and Major Bendetsen, 1 February 1942, 1:15 m., CWRIC 5:
807; see also Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
14 Transcript of telephone conversation between Mr. James
Rowe (Attorney General's Office) and Major Bendetsen, 29 January
1942, Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
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comments obviously had a profound effect on Bendetsen and
other military officers, for all increasingly suggested
using "military necessity" as a means for excluding
undesirable citizens from remaining in or near military
areas.
The principle of military necessity originated during
the Civil War as part of the United States' laws of war.
Dr. Francis Lieber, a professor of law at Columbia College,
codified the laws of war in 1862, then published them as
General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field, which has become
known as the "Lieber Code," in 1863. 15 In Article 14,
Lieber defined military necessity.
"Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized
nations, consists in the necessity of those m asures
which are indispensable for securing the ends 0 war,
and which are lawful according to the mod rn law and
usages of war. ,,16
Originally, this principle was intended to prevent the
needless and indiscriminate "capture or destruction of any
and all property belonging to any person owing allegiance to
an enemy government, whether or not these measures were
lS Burrus M. Carnahan, "Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War:
The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity,"
American Journal of International Law 92 (April 1998): 213-214;
Ralph H. Gabriel, "American Experience With Military Government,"
American Historical Review 49 (July 1944): 637-638.
]& William Gerald Downey, Jr., "The Law of War and Military
Necessity," American Journal of International Law 47 (April
1953): 252. See also Carnahan, "Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of
War," 215.
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-linked to military needs," which was corrunon practice in the
first half of the nineteenth century.l? The original intent
of military necessity surely changed by the middle of the
twentieth century, particularly as means of and reasons for
warfare changed. Although government and military officials
had violated American citizens' civil liberties during
previous wars, it is highly unlikely that Lieber would have
expected that military officers in 1942 would utilize this
principle to infringe on the civil liberties of American
citizens. Is
The idea of using military necessity to justify
excluding Americans of Japanese descent from the West Coast
may not have resulted only from the Bainbridge Island
debate, but also from discussions between the War and
Justice Departments. After these deb tes 0 curred, Major
Bendetsen and other government officials began suggesting
1/ Carnahan, "Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War," 217.
:0 For a discussion of the violation of civil liberties
during the Civil War, see Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of
Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991) and Charles R. Mink, "General Orders, No.
11: The Forced Evacuation of Civilians During the Civil War,"
Military Affairs 34 (December 1970): 132-136. The civil
liberties of American citizens were also violated during World
War I; see Kennedy, Over Here, 75-88; Paul L. Murphy, "Sources
and Nature of Intolerance in the 1920s," Journal of American
History 51 (June 1964), 63; Fred D. Ragan, "Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear and
Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919,"
Journal of American History 58 (June 1971): 37; Allan M. Brandt,
No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the
United States Since 1880, expanded ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982), 85-87.
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and developing the idea even more. In recounting a meeting
with Attorney General Biddle, Assistant Secretary of War
McCloy, and General Gullion to General DeWitt, Bendetsen
said that the Department of Justice would take no part in
removing "citizens of Japanese extraction." There was,
however, legal justification for restricting people from
certain areas, allowing only those permitted to enter those
areas, using the concept of military necessity. The Army
could thus use the same basis to designate specific areas as
off limits to Japanese Americans. The Department of Justice
apparently wanted to be able to disavow any participation in
such a decision. 19 Justice Department officials could have
been preparing a means for them to ease their way out of the
evacuation decision, for three days later, Colonel
Bendetsen20 told DeWitt that Department of Justice official
were "laying the foundation for an exit" so that they would
not be a part of the Army's plan to remove citizens from
certain areas. 21
Bendetsen soon developed and expanded the idea of using
military necessity. The lieutenant colonel used this
broader concept to convince General DeWitt that the Army
l~ Digest, General DeWitt, General Gullion and Major
Bendetsen Conversation of February 1, 1942, CWRIC 4: 260.
:0 Bendetsen had been promoted to lieutenant colonel earlier
that day.
cl Transcript of telephone conversation with General DeWitt, 4
February 1942, 6 o'clock P.M., Daniels, American Concentration Camps,
vol. 2.
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could legally exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from
military areas. In discussing the legality of military
necessity, the general expressed doubt about prosecuting
people who violated the military's restrictions. He knew
President Roosevelt would not declare martial law, and he
knew the Army could not intern civilians. Colonel Bendetsen
agreed with DeWitt's assessment, saying that the president
would not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but also added
that the general could "forcibly eject" citizens who
attempted to return to those military areas. 22 By ruling
out the possibility of interning citizens of Japanese
heritage and by supporting the idea of forcibly excluding
certain groups of people, particularly the Japanese,
Bendetsen and DeWitt, as well as the Army, took a step
toward refining the plan which the military would ultim tely
carry out in evacuating the West Coast Jap nese population.
Clearly, by this time, Colonel Bendetsen had realized
that although the government could not legally infring on
the rights of United States citizens, even those of Japanese
ancestry who might be extremely dangerous, the Army could
base the exclusion of citizens, particularly Japanese
Americans, on the idea of military necessity. At that point
in the war, with Japan's successes in Singapore, the Dutch
22 Transcript of telephone conversation between General
DeWitt and Colonel Bendetsen, 7{?) February 1942, Daniels,
American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
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East Indies, the Philippines, and other areas in the
Pacific, no one would question the military's attempts to
ensure the safety of the West Coast and the important
military installations located within the Western Defense
Command. Knowing that by the beginning of February 1942
many Americans doubted the loyalty of Japanese residing on
the West Coast, the colonel developed his plan for
justifying the exclusion of Americans of Japanese descent
from certain military areas within the Western Defense
Command.
Even before his conversation regarding the February 7
conversation with General DeWitt, in which they discussed
impossibility of the president declaring martial law,
Bendetsen and his superiors had obviously been discussing
and developing their plan to evacuate the Japanese from
specific areas along the Pacific Coast. Knowing that
DeWitt's recommendation would be crucial to the approval of
the Army's plan, other members of the War Department
attempted to change the general's mind about the feasibility
of removing Japanese Americans.
After a February 3 meeting with Secretary of War
Stimson, General Gullion, and Major Bendetsen, which clearly
reveals Bendetsen's influence on his superiors, Assistant
Secretary of War McCloy telephoned General DeWitt and
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attempted to convince him that the military could exclude
citizens of Japanese ancestry from restricted areas. 23
McCloy recognized the complexity of such an endeavor. In
telling DeWitt that he should not reveal that the Army
favored "a wholesale withdrawal of all Japanese citizens and
aliens from the coast," even in conversations with local
politicians because of "many legal questions involved in
discrimination between the native born Japanese (that is the
American citizens) and the aliens. ,,24 Later in the
conversation, however, DeWitt said he planned on removing
only enemy aliens from the restricted areas which the
Attorney General had designated. Apparently dissatisfied
with the general's idea, McCloy suggested an alternative
plan, in which he termed the prescribed areas "military
reservations in substance, and exclude everyone - whites,
yellows, blacks, greens - from that area and then license
back into the area those whom we felt there was no danger to
be expected from." By doing so, the Army could avoid legal
complications
because in spite of the constitution you can eliminate
from any military reservation, or any place that is
declared to be in substance a military reservation,
anyone - any American citizen, and we could exclude
everyone and then by a system of permits and licenses
:J Retyped transcript of telephone conversation between
General Gullion and General Clark, 4 February 1942, Daniels,
American Concentration Camps, vol. 2; see also CWRIC 34: 180-184.
24 Transcript of telephone conversation between General
DeWitt and Mr. McCloy, 3 February 1942, 2 o'clock, CWRIC 1: 132;
5: 809.
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-permitting those to come back into that area who were
necessary to enable that area to function as a living
community. Everyone but the Japs-25
Later that day, Bendetsen spoke with DeWitt and reasserted
the benefits of this plan. By evacuating all citizens and
allowing a military commander to decide who could return to
the designated military area, the commander could "keep out
alien enemies and American citizens of Japanese extraction,
and any other subversive individuals. u26 With this
justification for excluding Japanese from certain prescribed
military areas, the Army laid the foundation for the
decision as well as the actual plan to evacuate aliens and
Japanese Americans from the West Coast. General DeWitt
certainly could not ignore the recommendation of the
Assistant Secretary of War and Bendetsen.
After apparently convincing General DeWitt of the
feasibility of removing Japanese Americans from the West
Coast, Bendetsen submitted a memorandum to General Gullion
with his assessment of and recommendations regarding the
aliens and other subversive individuals on the West Coast.
The lieutenant colonel attempted to justify his opinion that
certain citizens, specifically Japanese Americans, not just
Axis nationals, should be removed from vital military areas.
2~ Ibid., CWRIC 1: 140; 5: 817.
2b Transcript of telephone conversation between General
DeWitt and Major Bendetsen, 3 February 1942, 6:15 p.m., Daniels,
American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
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Bendetsen said that because of their younger age than their
parents and grandparents, Japanese citizens posed more of a
threat to the safety of the country. Furthermore, the
Japanese Americans would become more hostile toward the
United States if their families were removed and interned.
Bendetsen then recommended removal of "all known subversive
individuals and all persons with suspected subversive
tendencies" so as to deny them access to vital
installations. In order to support his argument, Bendetsen
asserted that General DeWitt's plan of simply establishing
restricted military areas and removing enemy aliens from
those areas would not ensure the safety of the coast because
such a plan ignores the threat of the citizen saboteur. The
colonel recommended the creation of military areas, "islands
surrounding all vital installations in the Western Defense
Command (and subsequently elsewhere) from which all persons
who do not have express permission to enter and remain, ar
excluded as a measure of military necessity." He explain d
that excluding all citizens from military installations by
military authorities citing military necessity did not
constitute discrimination by class, and was therefore
legal. 27 Bendetsen had clearly contemplated the situation
and the implications of such a justification. The "lawyer
~1 Retyped memorandum for the Provost Marshal General from
Colonel Bendetsen, 4 February 1942, CWRIC 6: 220-223.
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in uniform" had devised a means to defend the Army's policy
regarding removal of American citizens of Japanese ancestry.
The remainder of the memorandum contained the rest of
Bendetsen's recommendations regarding the implementation of
the exclusion policy. First, the colonel wrote, "Power by
Executive Order [had to be] accorded the Secretary of War to
designate restricted, prohibited and military areas."
Second, the Western Defense Commander should recommend the
establishment of specific restricted military areas.
Lastly, those to be removed should be immediately evacuated
and interned until such point as they would be resettled
based on merit. Bendetsen concluded his memorandum with the
final recommendation that the military obtain the authority
via an executive order from the president. 28 This plan, the
recommendations which DeWitt submitted on February 14, and
the provisions of Executive Order No. 9066 are essentially
the same. The submission of his recommendations to General
Gullion reveals that Bendetsen was the ultimate source of
the exact plan to remove Japanese Americans from the West
Coast.
Having presented his recommendation to the Provost
Marshal General, Bendetsen had to further convince General
DeWitt of the importance and legality of the removal.
Secretary of War Stimson also wanted a definite
~a Ibid., CWRIC 6: 223-224.
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recommendation from the Western Defense Commander on the
scope of Japanese evacuation. The War Department believed
that the Nisei were dangerous.
It is generally accepted that the potential danger to
the American citizen of Japanese an estry is great if
not greater to the Japanese alien, particularly in
consideration of the fact that evacuation of the
Japanese alien alone is likely to be provocative so far
as the Japanese-American citizen is concerned. 29
Bendetsen essentially informed DeWitt that despite what the
general might think about the loyal y or disloyalty of the
American Japanese, the War Department perceived them as
threats to the security of the West Coast.
Besides telling the general what the Western Defense
Commander's opinion regarding the potential danger of the
Japanese-American population along the coast should be,
Bendetsen also told DeWitt how to justify the removal of
these American citizens. Any recommendation submitted to
Stimson "should be predicated on the military necessity
involved." Furthermore, only if the agricultural and
economic cost of removal far outweighed the benefit of
removal, "should the recommendation for evacuation be
,I
confined to selected areas."30 ot only did Bendetsen
stipulate the reasoning DeWitt was to se to justify
~~ Letter to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army [General DeWitt] from Colonel Bendetsen, 10
February 1942, CWRIC 10: 905.
3~ Ibid., CWRIC 10: 906.
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removal, he also told the general that he should not use his
previous ideas regarding a limited exclusion.
Possibly in order to clarify for the general the
constitutional aspects of the removal, as well as provide
some legal basis for their superiors, Bendetsen explained
that exclusion based on military necessity was legal.
Barring the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the
military did not have the authority to intern civilians.
Therefore, "the plan should contemplate voluntary
internment, pending selective resettlement. u31 Thus, the
military did not initially intend to intern or imprison
Japanese Americans. The Army hoped that the Japanese would
resettle, albeit without their alien family members, outside
of the restricted areas of their own volition.
Bendetsen's motivations for supporting the idea of
evacuation of Japanese Americans from the Pacific Co st
remain unclear. The most reasonable explanation seems to b
that he, like many white Californians and white Americans in
general, believed that Japanese Americans were indee more
loyal to their race than their nation of birth and
citizenship and therefore posed a significant threat to the
security of the country. As a military officer, he, like
DeWitt, most likely endorsed evacuation to ensure the safety
of the Western Defense Command.
:-1 Ibid., CWRIC 10: 907.
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Regardless of his motivations, over less than a three-
week period, Colonel Bendetsen conceived of, developed, and
initiated a plan that would allow the Army to remove not
just Axis aliens, but also Americans of Japanese ancestry
living on certain areas on the West Coast. In addition to
devising the plan, he convinced superior officers of the
legality of violating Americans' civil rights and worked
diligently to ensure the plan's implementation as soon as
possible. General DeWitt complied. Four days later DeWitt
submitted his memorandum to Secretary of War Stimson
recommending the evacuation of all enemy aliens and Japanese
Americans from the coast.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EVACUATION
Having decided that the safety of the Western Defense
Command partially depended on removing the Japanese inland,
and believing the military could legally move Japanese
Americans, Lieutenant General DeWitt submitted his
memorandum, "Evacuation of Japanese and Other Subversive
Persons from the Pacific Coast,U to Secretary of War Stimson
on February 14, 1942. This recommendation reveals the
influence of Earl Warren and Colonel Bendetsen, as well as
the general's belief that he could not trust the Japanese.
Citing the protective mission of the Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army and the potential sabotage threat which he
assumed existed on the West Coast, DeWitt recommended th t
the Secretary of War obtain authorization from he President
to "designate military areas in the combat zone of the
Western Theater of Operations,u from which Stimson could
"exclude all Japanese, all alien enemies, and all other
persons suspected for any reason by the administering
military authorities of being actual or potential saboteurs,
espionage agents, or fifth columnists. u The general also
recommended that the Attorney General designate military
areas in California, Oregon, and Washington, from which the
67
Secretary of War would provide for the exclusion of Japanese
aliens and citizens, all other Axis aliens, and "any and all
other persons who are suspected for any reason by the
administering military authorities to be" actual or
potential threats to the security of the United States.
DeWitt suggested that the government intern Japanese aliens
and other alien enemies, and offer Japanese Americans
"voluntary internment, under guard." If Japanese Americans
did not accept voluntary internment, DeWitt suggested that
they "be excluded from all military areas, and left of their
own resources," or alternatively, "be encouraged to accept
resettlement outside of such military areas with such
assistance as the State governments concerted or the Federal
Security Agency may be by that time prepared to offer.,,1
Possibly revealing his apprehension at interferin with
the rights of American citizens, the lieutenan" general
recommended that "mass internment be considered as largely a
temporary expedient pending selective resettlement, to b
accomplished by the various Security Agencies of the Federal
and State Governments."z General DeWitt obviously did not
intend to imprison all Americans of Japanese ancestry simply
because he feared they would commit sabotage in his theater
of operations. In February 1942 he merely recommended that
1 Memorandum to the Secretary of War from DeWitt, 13
February 1942, Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 2.
: Ibid.
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they accept voluntary internment or settle outside the
military combat zones so he could focus on safeguarding the
West Coast from enemy attack.
General DeWitt's recommendations to Secretary of War
Stimson began a series of events which culminated in the
internment of Japanese aliens and citizens. Five days after
DeWitt sent Stimson his memorandum, President Roosevelt
signed Executive Order No. 9066, which entitled the
Secretary of War or any other military commander to
authorize the designation of military areas from which the
military could exclude certain persons. Pursuant to that
executive order, on February 20, Stimson authorized DeWitt
to designate specific areas from which the lieutenant
general wanted to exclude all alien enemies and Japanese
Americans, which DeWitt subsequently did with numerous
civilian exclusion orders. 3 On March 2, 1942, General
DeWitt issued Public Proclamation Number 1, which divided
Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington into two
military zones, and required all alien enemies and all
people of Japanese ancestry to register with the federal
government. 4 The proclamation also encouraged alien enemies
J Dillon S. Myer, Uprooted Americans: The Japanese
Americans and the War Relocation Authority during World War II
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971), 23; Bosworth,
America's Concentration Camps, 65.
4 Izumi, "The Japanese American evacuation of 1942," 27;
Daniels, Decision, 52-53; Robert E. Cushman, "IV. Civil
Liberties" in "American Government in War-Time," American
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and Japanese Americans to move out of the "prohibited"
Military Area Number 1, inland to the "restricted" Military
Area Number 2. 5 With other public proclamations General
DeWitt extended the restrictions already placed on Axis
aliens to affect Japanese Americans as well. 6
On March 10, 1942 DeWitt created a Civil Affairs
Division (CAD) within his staff, and on March 11, 1942 he
established the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA)
to carry out the evacuation. Bendetsen became the chief of
both agencies, and thus directed the relocation process. 7
Voluntary evacuation proceeded slowly, mainly because
many people did not want Japanese, whom the government now
obviously considered too dangerous to live on the West
Coast, moving into their communities. s Only about two
thousand Japanese had move out of the prohibited area before
Political Science Review 37 (February 1943): 54; Sidney Fine,
"Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case," Pacific Historical
Review 33 (May 1964): 196.
~ Daniels, Decision, 53; Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard
S. Nishimoto, The Spoilage: Japanese American Evacuation and
Resettlement (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Pre s s , 194 6), 9.
6 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 9.
7 tenBroek, et. al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution,
118; Conn, et. al., Guarding the United States and Its Outposts,
141. See also Daniels, Decision, 54.
o tenBroek, et. al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution,
10-11; Bill Hosokawa, Nisei: The Quiet Americans (New York:
William Morris and Company, Inc., 1969), 318. See also Conn, et.
al., Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, 141; Daniels,
Concentration Camps U.S.A., 84; Cushman, "IV. Civil Liberties,"
54; Paul R. Spickard, Japanese Americans: The Formation and
Transformation of an Ethnic Group (New York: Twayne Publishers,
1996),100.
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March 27, when, under the advice of Colonel Bendetsen,
General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation Number 4, which
stopped all voluntary migration at midnight March 29. 9 The
military and civilian authorities then developed plans for
the systematic mass evacuation and internment of Japanese
citizens and aliens. 10
The Japanese American relocation began with DeWitt's
promulgation of several Civilian Exclusion Orders. The
first such order, issued on March 24, 1942, resulted in the
eventual evacuation of two-hundred fifty-eight Japanese from
Bainbridge Island, Washington, and their subsequent
internment at Manzanar in California. Ninety-eight Civilian
,I
Exclusion Orders followed the initial order. By the end of
1942 almost one-hundred twenty thousand Japanese residents
of the Pacific oast had been excluded from the West Co st
and had moved either to interior locations or to the ten W r
Relocation Authority "relocation centers".ll
9 Conn, et. al., Guarding the United States and Its
Outposts, 139-140, 141; tenBroek, et. al., Prejudice, War and the
Constitution, 11; John Morton Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics
and American Culture During World War II (San Diego, CA: Harcourt
Brace Jovonovich, 1976), 161. See also U.S. Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice
Denied, 103.
10 Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, 11.
11 Ibid.; Ruth P. Vickers, "Japanese-American Relocation,"
Arkansas Historical Quarterly 10 (Summer 1951): 169; Wartime
Exile, 1; Conn, "The Decision to Evacuate the Japanese from the
West Coast (1942)," 108. See also U.S. Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied,
107; tenBroek, et. al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution, 120.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
Fear and distrust of the Japanese on the West Coast
grew in the two months following Pearl Harbor. As more and
more people, including citizens, influential politicians,
and military officers, began to question the safety of th
coast because of the large and apparently menacing Japanese
presence, members of the military and War Department
formulated a plan to remove not only alien enemies, but also
American citizens of Japanese ancestry.
General DeWitt never changed his opinion regarding the
removal of aliens from vital military areas, but his
attitude toward Japanese Americans varied. At th beginnin
of the war, he rejected the idea of a mass evacuation of
citizens as "damned nonsense,u but by the middle of February
1942, he supported removing Japanese Americans and all enemy
.
•1
aliens from the West Coast. Public opinion and the
influence of California politicians such as Governor Olson
and Attorney General Warren slowly affected the lieutenant
general's opinion regarding he coastal Japanese population.
As more people asserted that the Japanese could not be
trusted and as rumors of Japanese sabotage efforts became
more widespread, DeWitt began to reveal his distrust of the
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American-born Japanese and slowly began to favor their
removal. Secretary of the Navy Knox's statement and the
Roberts Report seemed to be reliable "proof" that Japanese
Americans had assisted in Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.
Bendetsen also influenced the general's opinion, for he
suggested to his superior officer that Justice Department
efforts would not necessarily successfully remove the threat
of sabotage. DeWitt knew that his duty was to protect the
Western Defense Command, and was determined to do so, yet he
also knew that he could not legally exclude American
citizens from areas along the West Coast.
At first, the general's distrust of citizens of
Japanese ancestry did not outweigh his unwillingness to
violate these citizens' constitutional rights, so despite
the fact that he believed that alien and citizen Japanese
posed a potential sabotage threat to his command, DeWitt
believed that the military had no legal authority to exclude
citizens. It was because of these doubts that Major
Bendetsen became an important figure in the decision-making
process.
Because of the problem of an acceptable reason for
removing Japanese Americans as well as enemy aliens from
strategic areas, Bendetsen first had to determine a legal
basis for excluding Japanese itizens from certain areas on
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the West Coast. The major's conversations with Justice and
War Department officials led him to believe that the
military could forcibly exclude citizens from the West Coast
if the Army based the decision on military necessity. Once
he had formulated a feasible and apparently legal plan,
Bendetsen persuaded his superiors in the War Department and
General DeWitt that by claiming that the military needed to
protect vital installations from possible saboteurs, the
Army could indeed forcibly eject American citizens from
specified locations within the Western Defense Command. As
most of Bendetsen's superiors already apparently distrusted
the Japanese, he did not have to work hard to convince them
to support and execute the plan. Once the colonel convinced
DeWitt of the feasibility of the plan, the War Department
simply needed the Western Defense Commander's formal
recommendation in order to submit a definite pi n to
Secretary of War Stimson and then to President Roosevelt.
Regardless of the thoughts and desires of members of
the War Department, they would not have convinced Stimson to
submit Executive Order No. 9066 to the president without the
specific recommendation of the Western Defense Commander.
As the military officer charged with defending the ntire
West Coast, DeWitt's assessment of and recommendations
regarding the supposed threat the Japanese posed determined
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how the military and federal government in general reacted
to the wartime fears and paranoia, as well as the rising cry
for relocation and internment of all Japanese. The War
Department needed General DeWitt's recommendation for
removal, and DeWitt was unwilling to recommend evacuation
without some legal justification. Bendetsen's position as
liaison between the Western Defense Command and War
Department allowed him to exert considerable influence upon
his superiors. DeWitt quite possibly accepted the colonel's
explanation of military necessity because Bendetsen was a
lawyer, one who would surely know what the government could
and could not do regarding the rights of citizens. The
opinions of both General DeWitt and Major Bendetsen allowed
the federal government to formulate and execute the plan to
forcibly exclude and relocate Japanese Americ ns from the
West Coast.
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